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📣 How DataDome Protected a Cashback Website from an Aggressive Credential Stuffing Attack 👏 For 15 hours total—11:30 a.m. on May 26 to 3 a.m. on May 27—the login endpoint of a cashback website was targeted in a credential stuffing attack. The attack included: 🔵 16.6K IP addresses making requests. 🔵 ~132 login attempts per IP address. 🔵 2,200,000 overall credential stuffing attempts. The attack was distributed with 16.6K different IP addresses, but there were some commonalities between requests: 👉 The attacker used a single user-agent. 👉 Every bot used the same accept-language. 👉 The attacker used data-center IP addresses, rather than residential proxies. 👉 The attacker made requests on only one URL: login. 👉 Bots didn’t include the DataDome cookie on any request. How was the attack blocked? ✅ Thanks to our multi-layered detection approach, the attack was blocked using different independent categories of signals. The main detection signal here was server-side fingerprinting inconsistency. The attack had a unique server-side fingerprint hash, where the accept-encoding header content was malformed due to spaces missing between each value. Get the full details: https://lnkd.in/e-VHcRxC

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