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\n \n NAVAL WAR OF 1812. 31
Farragut s, although of course his judgment
was ex post facto, as he was very young at the
time of the fight.
In the first place, I consider our original
and greatest error was in attempting to regain
the anchorage being greatly superior in sail-
ing powers we should have borne up and run
before the wind. If we had come in contact
with the Pha^he we should have carried her by
boarding if she avoided us, as she might
have done by her greater ability to manoeuvre^
then we should have taken her fire and passed
on, leaving both vessels behind until we had
replaced our top-mast, by which time they
would have been separated, as unless they did
so it would have been no chase, the Cherub
being a dull sailer.
Secondly, when it was apparent to every-
body that we had no chance of success under
the circumstances, the ship should have been
run ashore, throwing her broadside to the
beach to prevent raking, and fought as long
as was consistent with humanity, and then set
on fire. But having determined upon anchor-
ing we should have bent a spring on to the
ring of the anchor, instead of to the cable,
where it was exposed, and could be shot away
as fast as put on.
But it must be remembered that when Porter
decided to anchor near shore, in neutral water,
he could not anticipate Hilyar s deliberate
and treacherous breach of faith. I do not
allude to the mere disregard of neutrality.
Whatever international moralists may say,
such disregard is a mere question of expe-\n \n
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